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ABSTRACT
Many blockchain-based algorithms, such as Bitcoin, implement a
decentralized asset transfer system, often referred to as a cryptocur-
rency. As stated in the original paper by Nakamoto, at the heart of
these systems lies the problem of preventing double-spending; this
is usually solved by achieving consensus on the order of transfers
among the participants. In this paper, we treat the asset transfer
problem as a concurrent object and determine its consensus num-
ber, showing that consensus is, in fact, not necessary to prevent
double-spending.
We first consider the problem as defined by Nakamoto, where
only a single process—the account owner—canwithdraw fromeach
account. Safety and liveness need to be ensured for correct account
owners, whereas misbehaving account owners might be unable to
perform transfers. We show that the consensus number of an asset
transfer object is 1.We then consider a more general k-shared asset
transfer object where up to k processes can atomically withdraw
from the same account, and show that this object has consensus
number k .
We establish our results in the context of shared memory with
benign faults, allowing us to properly understand the level of diffi-
culty of the asset transfer problem. We also translate these results
in the message passing setting with Byzantine players, a model
that is more relevant in practice. In this model, we describe an
asynchronous Byzantine fault-tolerant asset transfer implementa-
tion that is both simpler and more efficient than state-of-the-art
consensus-based solutions. Our results are applicable to both the
permissioned (private) and permissionless (public) setting, as nor-
mally their differentiation is hidden by the abstractions on top of
which our algorithms are based.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Theory of computation→ Distributed algorithms.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Bitcoin protocol, introduced in 2008 by Satoshi Nakamoto, im-
plements a cryptocurrency: an electronic decentralized asset trans-
fer system [38]. Since then, many alternatives to Bitcoin came
to prominence. These include major cryptocurrencies such as
Ethereum [47] or Ripple [40], as well as systems sparked from re-
search or industry efforts such as Bitcoin-NG [18], Algorand [22],
ByzCoin [32], Stellar [37], Hyperledger [4], Corda [26], or Sol-
ida [2]. Each alternative brings novel approaches to implementing
decentralized transfers, and sometimes offers a more general in-
terface (known as smart contracts [43]) than the original protocol
proposed by Nakamoto. They improve over Bitcoin in various as-
pects, such as performance, energy-efficiency, or security.
A common theme in these protocols, whether they are for basic
transfers [33] or smart contracts [47], is that they seek to imple-
ment a blockchain—a distributed ledger where all the transfers in
the system are totally ordered. Achieving total order among mul-
tiple inputs (e.g., transfers) is fundamentally a hard task, equiva-
lent to solving consensus [25, 27]. Consensus [19], a central prob-
lem in distributed computing, is known for its notorious difficulty.
It has no deterministic solution in asynchronous systems if just
a single participant can fail [19]. Partially synchronous consen-
sus algorithms are tricky to implement correctly [1, 12, 15] and
face tough trade-offs between performance, security, and energy-
efficiency [5, 8, 23, 46]. Not surprisingly, the consensus module is
a major bottleneck in blockchain-based protocols [26, 42, 46].
A close look at Nakamoto’s original paper reveals that the
central issue in implementing a decentralized asset transfer sys-
tem (i.e., a cryptocurrency) is preventing double-spending, i.e.,
spending the same money more than once [38]. Bitcoin and nu-
merous follow-up systems typically assume that total order—and
thus consensus—is vital to preventing double-spending [20]. There
seems to be a common belief, indeed, that a consensus algorithm is
essential for implementing decentralized asset transfers [9, 23, 31,
38].
As our main result in this paper, we show that this belief is false.
We do so by casting the asset transfer problem as a sequential object
type and determining that it has consensus number 1 in Herlihy’s
hierarchy [27].1
1The consensus number of an object type is the maximal number of processes that can
solve consensus using only read-write shared memory and arbitrarily many objects
of this type.
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The intuition behind this result is the following. An asset trans-
fer object maintains a set of accounts. Each account is associated
with an owner process that is the only one allowed to issue trans-
fers withdrawing from this account. Every process can however
read the balance of any account.
The main insight here is that relating accounts to unique own-
ers obviates the need for consensus. It is the owner that decides on
the order of transfers from its own account, without the need to
agree with any other process—thus the consensus number 1. Other
processes only validate the owner’s decisions, ensuring that causal
relations across accounts are respected. We describe a simple as-
set transfer implementation using atomic-snapshot memory [3].
A withdrawal from an account is validated by relating the with-
drawn amount with the incoming transfers found in the memory
snapshot. Intuitively, as at most one withdrawal can be active on a
given account at a time, it is safe to declare the validated operation
as successful and post it in the snapshot memory.
We also present a natural generalization of our result to the set-
ting in which multiple processes are allowed to withdraw from
the same account. A k-shared asset-transfer object allows up to
k processes to execute outgoing transfers from the same account.
We prove that such an object has consensus number k and thus
allows for implementing state machine replication (now often re-
ferred to as smart contracts) among the k involved processes using
k-consensus objects [30]. We show thatk-shared asset transfer has
consensus number k by reducing it to k-consensus (known to have
consensus number k) and reducing k-consensus to asset transfer.
Having established the relative ease of the asset transfer prob-
lem using the shared memory model, we also present a practical
solution to this problem in the setting of Byzantine fault-prone pro-
cesses communicating via message passing. This setting matches
realistic deployments of distributed systems. We describe an asset
transfer implementation that does not resort to consensus. Instead,
the implementation relies on a secure broadcast primitive that en-
sures uniform reliable delivery with only weak ordering guaran-
tees [35, 36], circumventing hurdles imposed by consensus. In the
k-shared case, our results imply that to execute some form of smart
contract involving k users, consensus is only needed among thesek
nodes and not among all nodes in the system. In particular, should
these k nodes be faulty, the rest of the accounts will not be affected.
To summarize, we argue that treating the asset transfer problem
as a concurrent data structure and measuring its hardness through
the lense of distributed computing help understand it and devise
better solutions to it.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first give the
formal definition of the shared memory model and the asset trans-
fer object type (Section 2). Then, we show that this object type has
consensus number 1 (Section 3). Next, we generalize our result by
proving that ak-shared asset transfer object has consensus number
k (Section 4). Finally, we describe the implications of our results in
the message passing model with Byzantine faults (Sections 5 and 6)
and discuss related work (Section 7).
2 SHARED MEMORY MODEL AND
ASSET-TRANSFER OBJECT TYPE
We now present the shared memory model (Section 2.1) and pre-
cisely define the problem of asset-transfer as a sequential object
type (Section 2.2).
2.1 Definitions
Processes. We assume a set Π of N asynchronous processes that
communicate by invoking atomic operations on shared memory
objects. Processes are sequential—we assume that a process never
invokes a new operation before obtaining a response from a previ-
ous one.
Object types. A sequential object type is defined as a tuple T =
(Q,q0,O,R, ∆), where Q is a set of states, q0 ∈ Q is an initial state,
O is a set of operations, R is a set of responses and ∆ ⊆ Q × Π ×
O ×Q × R is a relation that associates a state, a process identifier
and an operation to a set of possible new states and corresponding
responses. We assume that ∆ is total on the first three elements.
A history is a sequence of invocations and responses, each invo-
cation or response associatedwith a process identifier. A sequential
history is a history that starts with an invocation and in which ev-
ery invocation is immediately followed with a response associated
with the same process. A sequential history is legal if its invoca-
tions and responses respect the relation ∆ for some sequence of
state assignments.
Implementations. An implementation of an object typeT is a dis-
tributed algorithm that, for each process and invoked operation,
prescribes the actions that the process needs to take to perform it.
An execution of an implementation is a sequence of events: invo-
cations and responses of operations or atomic accesses to shared
abstractions. The sequence of events at every process must respect
the algorithm assigned to it.
Failures. Processes are subject to crash failures (we consider
more general Byzantine failures in the next section). A processmay
halt prematurely, in which case we say that the process is crashed.
A process is called faulty if it crashes during the execution. A pro-
cess is correct if it is not faulty. All algorithms we present in the
shared memory model are wait-free—every correct process eventu-
ally returns from each operation it invokes, regardless of an arbi-
trary number of other processes crashing or concurrently invoking
operations.
Linearizability. For each pattern of operation invocations, the
execution produces a history, i.e., a sequence of distinct invoca-
tions and responses, labelled with process identifiers and unique
sequence numbers.
A projection of a history H to process p, denoted H |p is the sub-
sequence of elements of H labelled with p. An invocation o by a
process p is incomplete in H if it is not followed by a response in
H |p. A history is complete if it has no incomplete invocations. A
completion of H is a history H¯ that is identical to H except that
every incomplete invocation in H is either removed or completed
by inserting a matching response somewhere after it.
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An invocation o1 precedes an invocation o2 in H , denoted
o1 ≺H o2, if o1 is complete and the corresponding response r1 pre-
cedes o2 in H . Note that ≺H stipulates a partial order on invoca-
tions in H . A linearizable implementation (also said an atomic ob-
ject) of type T ensures that for every history H it produces, there
exists a completion H¯ and a legal sequential history S such that
(1) for all processes p, H¯ |p = S |p and (2) ≺H ⊆≺S .
Consensus number. The problem of consensus consists for a set
of processes to propose values and decide on the proposed values so
that no two processes decide on defferent values and every correct
process decides. The consensus number of a type T is the maximal
number of processes that can solve consensus using atomic objects
of typeT and read-write registers.
2.2 The asset transfer object type
LetA be a set of accounts and µ : A → 2Π be an “owner” map that
associates each account with a set of processes that are, intuitively,
allowed to debit the account. We define the asset-transfer object
type associated withA and µ as a tuple (Q,q0,O,R, ∆), where:
• The set of statesQ is the set of all possible mapsq : A → N.
Intuitively, each state of the object assigns each account its
balance.
• The initialization map q0 : A → N assigns the initial bal-
ance to each account.
• Operations and responses of the type are defined as O =
{transfer(a,b,x) : a,b ∈ A, x ∈ N} ∪ {read(a) : a ∈ A}
and R = {true, false} ∪N.
• ∆ is the set of valid state transitions. For a state q ∈ Q , a
process p ∈ Π, an operation o ∈ O , a response r ∈ R and a
new state q′ ∈ Q , the tuple (q,p,o,q′, r ) ∈ ∆ if and only if
one of the following conditions is satisfied:
– o = transfer(a,b,x)∧p ∈ µ(a) ∧q(a) ≥ x ∧q′(a) = q(a)−x
∧ q′(b) = q(b) + x ∧ ∀c ∈ A \ {a,b} : q′(c) = q(c) (all
other accounts unchanged) ∧ r = true;
– o = transfer(a,b,x) ∧ (p < µ(a) ∨ q(a) < x) ∧ q′ = q ∧
r = false;
– o = read(a) ∧ q = q′ ∧ r = q(a).
In other words, operation transfer(a,b,x) invoked by process
p succeeds if and only if p is the owner of the source account a
and account a has enough balance, and if it does, x is transferred
from a to the destination account b . A transfer(a,b,x) operation is
called outgoing for a and incoming for b; respectively, the x units
are called outgoing for a and incoming for b . A transfer is successful
if its corresponding response is true and failed if its corresponding
response is false. Operation read(a) simply returns the balance of
a and leaves the account balances untouched.
As in Nakamoto’s original paper [38], we assume for the mo-
ment that an asset-transfer object has at most one owner per ac-
count: ∀a ∈ A : |µ(a)| ≤ 1. Later we lift this assumption and con-
sider more general k-shared asset-transfer objects with arbitrary
owner maps µ (Section 4). For the sake of simplicity, we also restrict
ourselves to transfers with a single source account and a single des-
tination account. However, our definition (and implementation) of
the asset-transfer object type can trivially be extended to support
transfers with multiple source accounts (all owned by the same
sequential process) and multiple destination accounts.
3 ASSET TRANSFER HAS CONSENSUS
NUMBER 1
In this section, we show that the asset-transfer type can be wait-
free implemented using only read-write registers in a shared mem-
ory system with crash failures. Thus, the type has consensus num-
ber 1 [27].
Consider an asset-transfer object associated with a set of ac-
counts A and an ownership map µ where ∀a ∈ A, |µ(a)| ≤ 1.
Our implementation is described in Figure 1. Every process p is as-
sociated with a distinct location in an atomic snapshot object [3]
storing the set of all successful transfer operations executed by p
so far. Since each account is owned by at most one process, all out-
going transfers for an account appear in a single location of the
atomic snapshot (associated with the owner process). This princi-
ple bears a similarity to the implementation of a counter object.
Recall that the atomic snapshot (AS) memory is represented as a
vector of N shared variables that can be accessed with two atomic
operations: update and snapshot. An update operation modifies the
value at a given position of the vector and a snapshot returns the
state of the whole vector. We implement the read and transfer op-
erations as follows.
• To read the balance of an account a, the process simply takes
a snapshot S and returns the initial balance plus the sum of
incoming amounts minus the sum of all outgoing amounts.
We denote this number by balance(a,S). As we argue below,
the result is guaranteed to be non-negative, i.e., the opera-
tion is correct with respect to the type specification.
• To perform transfer(a,b,x), a process p, the owner of a,
takes a snapshot S and computes balance(a, S). If the amount
to be transferred does not exceed balance(a,S), we add the
transfer operation to the set of p’s operations in the snap-
shot object via an update operation and return true. Other-
wise, the operation returns false.
Shared variables:
AS , atomic snapshot, initially {⊥}N
Local variables:
opsp ⊆ A × A × N, initially ∅
Upon transfer(a, b, x )
1 S = AS .snapshot()
2 if p < µ(a) ∨ balance(a, S ) < x then
3 return false
4 opsp = opsp ∪ {(a, b, x )}
5 AS .update(opsp )
6 return true
Upon read(a)
7 S = AS .snapshot()
8 return balance(a, S )
Figure 1: Wait-free implementation of asset-transfer: code
for process p
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Theorem 1. The asset-transfer object type has a wait-free imple-
mentation in the read-write shared memory model.
Proof. Fix an execution E of the algorithm in Figure 1. Atomic
snapshots can be wait-free implemented in the read-write shared
memory model [3]. As every operation only involves a finite num-
ber of atomic snapshot accesses, every process completes each of
the operations it invokes in a finite number of its own steps.
Let Ops be the set of:
• All invocations of transfer or read in E that returned, and
• All invocations of transfer in E that completed the update
operation (line 5).
Let H be the history of E. We define a completion of H and, for
each o ∈ Ops, we define a linearization point as follows:
• If o is a read operation, it linearizes at the linearization point
of the snapshot operation in line 7.
• If o is a transfer operation that returns false, it linearizes at
the linearization point of the snapshot operation in line 1.
• If o is a transfer operation that completed the update oper-
ation, it linearizes at the linearization point of the update
operation in line 5. If o is incomplete in H , we complete it
with response true.
Let H¯ be the resulting complete history and let L be the sequence
of complete invocations of H¯ in the order of their linearization
points in E. Note that, by the way we linearize invocations, the
linearization of a prefix of E is a prefix of L.
Now we show that L is legal and, thus,H is linearizable. We pro-
ceed by induction, starting with the empty (trivially legal) prefix
of L. Let Lℓ be the legal prefix of the first ℓ invocations and op be
the (ℓ + 1)st operation of L. Let op be invoked by process p. The
following cases are possible:
• op is a read(a): the snapshot taken at the linearization point
of op contains all successful transfers concerning a in Lℓ .
By the induction hypothesis, the resulting balance is non-
negative.
• op is a failed transfer(a,b,x): the snapshot taken at the lin-
earization point of op contains all successful transfers con-
cerning a in Lℓ . By the induction hypothesis, the resulting
balance is non-negative.
• op is a successful transfer(a,b,x): by the algorithm, before
the linearization point of op, process p took a snapshot. Let
Lk , k ≤ ℓ, be the prefix of Lℓ that only contain operations
linearized before the point in time when the snapshot was
taken by p.
We observe that Lk includes a subset of all incoming trans-
fers on a and all outgoing transfers on a in Lℓ . Indeed, as
p is the owner of a and only the owner of a can perform
outgoing transfers on a, all outgoing transfers in Lℓ were
linearized before the moment p took the snapshot within
op. Thus, balance(a,Lk ) ≤ balance(a,Lℓ).
2
By the algorithm, as op = transfer(a,b,x) succeeds, we have
balance(a,Lk ) ≥ x . Thus, balance(a,Lℓ) ≥ x and the result-
ing balance in Lℓ+1 is non-negative.
Thus, H is linearizable. 
2 Analogously to balance(a, S ) that computes the balance for account a based on
the transfers contained in snapshot S , balance(a, L), if L is a sequence of operations,
computes the balance of account a based on all transfers in L.
Shared variables:
R[i], i ∈ 1, . . . , k , k registers, initially R[i] = ⊥, ∀i
AT , k-shared asset-transfer object containing:
– an account a with initial balance 2k
owned by processes 1, . . . , k
– some account s
Upon propose(v):
1 R[p].write(v)
2 AT .transf er (a, s, 2k − p))
3 return R[AT .read(a)].read()
Figure 2: Wait-free implementation of consensus among k
processes using a k-shared asset-transfer object. Code for
process p ∈ {1, . . . ,k}.
Corollary 1. The asset-transfer object type has
consensus number 1.
4 k-SHARED ASSET TRANSFER HAS
CONSENSUS NUMBER k
Wenow consider the case with an arbitrary owner map µ. We show
that an asset-transfer object’s consensus number is the maximal
number of processes sharing an account. More precisely, the con-
sensus number of an asset-transfer object is maxa∈A |µ(a)|.
We say that an asset-transfer object, defined on a set of accounts
A with an ownership map µ, is k-shared iffmaxa∈A |µ(a)| = k . In
other words, the object is k-shared if µ allows at least one account
to be owned by k processes, and no account is owned bymore than
k processes.
We show that the consensus number of any k-shared asset-
transfer object is k , which generalizes our result in Corollary 1. We
first show that such an object has consensus number at least k by
implementing consensus for k processes using only registers and
an instance ofk-shared asset-transfer.We then show thatk-shared
asset-transfer has consensus number at most k by reducing it to k-
consensus, an object known to have consensus number k [30].
Lemma 1. Consensus has a wait-free implementation for k pro-
cesses in the read-write shared memorymodel equippedwith a single
k-shared asset-transfer object.
Proof. We now provide a wait-free algorithm that solves con-
sensus among k processes using only registers and an instance of
k-shared asset-transfer. The algorithm is described in Figure 2. In-
tuitively, k processes use one shared account a to elect one of them
whose input value will be decided. Before a process p accesses the
shared account, p announces its input in a register (line 1). Process
p then tries to perform a transfer from account a to another ac-
count. The amount withdrawn this way from account a is chosen
specifically such that:
(1) only one transfer operation can ever succeed, and
(2) if the transfer succeeds, the remaining balance on a will
uniquely identify process p.
To satisfy the above conditions, we initialize the balance of account
a to 2k and have each processp ∈ {1, . . . ,k} transfer 2k−p (line 2).
Note that transfer operations invoked by distinct processes p,q ∈
4
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{1, . . . ,k} have arguments 2k −p and 2k −q, and 2k −p + 2k −q ≥
2k − k + 2k − (k − 1) = 2k + 1. The initial balance of a is only 2k
and no incoming transfers are ever executed. Therefore, the first
transfer operation to be applied to the object succeeds (no transfer
tries to withdrawmore then 2k) and the remaining operations will
have to fail due to insufficient balance.
When p reaches line 3, at least one transfer must have succeeded:
(1) either p’s transfer succeeded, or
(2) p’s transfer failed due to insufficient balance, in which case
some other process must have previously succeeded.
Let q be the process whose transfer succeeded. Thus, the balance
of account a is 2k − (2k − q) = q. Since q performed a transfer
operation, by the algorithm, q must have previously written its
proposal to the register R[q]. Regardless of whether p = q or p , q,
reading the balance of account a returns q and p decides the value
of R[q]. 
To prove that k-shared asset-transfer has consensus number at
most k , we reduce k-shared asset-transfer to k-consensus. A k-
consensus object exports a single operation propose that, the first k
times it is invoked, returns the argument of the first invocation. All
subsequent invocations return⊥. Given thatk-consensus is known
to have consensus number exactly k [30], a wait-free algorithm
implementing k-shared asset-transfer using only registers and k-
consensus objects implies that the consensus number of k-shared
asset-transfer is not more than k .
The algorithm reducing k-shared asset-transfer to k-consensus
is given in Figure 3. Before presenting a formal correctness argu-
ment, we first informally explain the intuition of the algorithm. In
our reduction, we associate a series of k-consensus objects with
every account a. Up to k owners of a use the k-consensus objects
to agree on the order of outgoing transfers for a.
We maintain the state of the implemented k-shared asset-
transfer object using an atomic snapshot object AS . Every process
p uses a distinct entry of AS to store a set hist. hist is a subset of
all completed outgoing transfers from accounts that p owns (and
thus is allowed to debit). For example, if p is the owner of accounts
d and e , p’s hist contains outgoing transfers from d and e . Each el-
ement in the hist set is represented as ((a,b,x, s, r ), result), where
a,b , and x are the respective source account, destination account,
and the amount transferred, s is the originator of the transfer, and
r is the round in which the transfer was invoked by the originator.
The value of result ∈ {success, failure} indicates whether the
transfer succeeds or fails. A transfer becomes “visible” when any
process inserts it in its corresponding entry of AS .
To read the balance of account a, a process takes a snapshot of
AS , and then sums the initial balance q0(a) and amounts of all suc-
cessful incoming transfers, and subtracts the amounts of successful
outgoing transfers found in AS . We say that a successful transfer
tx is in a snapshot AS (denoted by (tx, success) ∈ AS) if there
exists an entry e in AS such that (tx, success) ∈ AS[e].
To execute a transfer o outgoing from account a, a processp first
announces o in a register Ra that can be written by p and read by
any other process. This enables a “helping” mechanism needed to
ensure wait-freedom to the owners of a [27].
Next,p collects the transfers proposed by other owners and tries
to agree on the order of the collected transfers and their results
Shared variables:
AS , atomic snapshot object
for each a ∈ A:
Ra [i], i ∈ Π, registers, initially [⊥, . . . , ⊥]
kCa [i], i ≥ 0, list of instances of k-consensus objects
Local variables:
hist: a set of completed trasfers, initially empty
for each a ∈ A:
committeda , initially ∅
rounda , initially 0
Upon transfer(a, b, x ):
1 if p < µ(a) then
2 return false
3 tx = (a, b, x, p, rounda )
4 Ra [p].write(tx )
5 collected = collect(a) \ committeda
6 while tx ∈ collected do
7 req = the oldest transfer in collected
8 prop = proposal(req, AS .snapshot ())
9 decision = kCa [rounda ].propose(prop)
10 hist = hist ∪ {decision}
11 AS .update(hist)
12 committeda = committeda ∪ {t : decision = (t, ∗)}
13 collected = collected \ committeda
14 rounda = rounda + 1
15 if (tx, success) ∈ hist then
16 return true
17 else
18 return false
Upon read(a):
19 return balance(a, AS .snapshot ())
collect(a):
20 collected = ∅
21 for all i = Π do
22 if Ra [i].read() , ⊥ then
23 collected = collected ∪ {Ra [i].read()}
24 return collected
proposal((a, b, q, x ), snapshot):
25 if balance(a, snapshot) ≥ x then
26 prop = ((a, b, q, x ), success)
27 else
28 prop = ((a, b, q, x ), failure)
29 return prop
balance(a, snapshot):
30 incoming = {tx : tx = (∗, a, ∗, ∗, ∗) ∧ (tx, success) ∈ snapshot }
31 outgoing = {tx : tx = (a, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗) ∧ (tx, success) ∈ snapshot }
32 return q0(a) +
(∑
(∗,a,x,∗,∗)∈incoming x
)
−
(∑
(a,∗,x,∗,∗)∈outgoing x
)
Figure 3: Wait-free implementation of a k-shared asset-
transfer object usingk-consensus objects. Code for processp.
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using a series of k-consensus objects. For each account, the agree-
ment on the order of transfer-result pairs proceeds in rounds. Each
round is associated with a k-consensus object which p invokes
with a proposal chosen from the set of collected transfers. Since
each process, in each round, only invokes the k-consensus object
once, no k-consensus object is invoked more than k times and thus
each invocation returns a value (and not ⊥).
A transfer-result pair as a proposal for the next instance of k-
consensus is chosen as follows. Process p picks the “oldest” col-
lected but not yet committed operation (based on the round num-
ber rounda attached to the transfer operation when a process an-
nounces it; ties are broken using process IDs). Then p takes a snap-
shot of AS and checks whether account a has sufficient balance
according to the state represented by the snapshot, and equips
the transfer with a corresponding success / failure flag. The
resulting transfer-result pair constitutes p’s proposal for the next
instance of k-consensus. The currently executed transfer by pro-
cess p returns as soon as it is decided by a k-consensus object, the
flag of the decided value (success/failure) indicating the transfer’s
response (true/false).
Lemma 2. The k-shared asset-transfer object type has a wait-free
implementation in the read-write shared memory model equipped
with k-consensus objects.
Proof. We essentially follow the footpath of the proof of The-
orem 1. Fix an execution E of the algorithm in Figure 3. Let H be
the history of E.
To perform a transfer o on an account a, p registers it in Ra [p]
(line 4) and then proceeds through a series of k-consensus objects,
each time collecting Ra to learn about the transfers concurrently
proposed by other owners of a. Recall that each k-consensus object
is wait-free. Suppose, by contradiction, that o is registered in Ra
but is never decided by any instance of k-consensus. Eventually,
however, o becomes the request with the lowest round number in
Ra and, thus, some instance of k-consensus will be only accessed
with o as a proposed value (line 9). By validity of k-consensus, this
instance will return o and, thus, p will be able to complete o.
Let Ops be the set of all complete operations and all transfer op-
erations o such that some process completed the update operation
(line 11) in E with an argument including o (the atomic snapshot
and k-consensus operation has been linearized). Intuitively, we in-
clude in Ops all operations that took effect, either by returning a
response to the user or by affecting other operations. Recall that
every such transfer operation was agreed upon in an instance of
k-consensus, let it be kCo . Therefore, for every such transfer oper-
ation o, we can identify the process qo whose proposal has been
decided in that instance.
We now determine a completion of H and, for each o ∈ Ops, we
define a linearization point as follows:
• If o is a read operation, it linearizes at the linearization point
of the snapshot operation (line 19).
• If o is a transfer operation that returns false, it linearizes
at the linearization point of the snapshot operation (line 8)
performed by qo just before it invoked kCo .propose().
• If o is a transfer operation that some process included in
the update operation (line 11), it linearizes at the lineariza-
tion point of the first update operation inH (line 11) that in-
cludes o. Furthermore, if o is incomplete in H , we complete
it with response true.
Let H¯ be the resulting complete history and let L be the se-
quence of complete operations of H¯ in the order of their lineariza-
tion points in E. Note that, by the way we linearize operations, the
linearization of a prefix of E is a prefix of L. Also, by construction,
the linearization point of an operation belongs to its interval.
Nowwe show that L is legal and, thus,H is linearizable. We pro-
ceed by induction, starting with the empty (trivially legal) prefix
of L. Let Lℓ be the legal prefix of the first ℓ operation and op be
the (ℓ + 1)st operation of L. Let op be invoked by process p. The
following cases are possible:
• op is a read(a): the snapshot taken at op’s linearization point
contains all successful transfers concerning a in Lℓ . By the
induction hypothesis, the resulting balance is non-negative.
• op is a failed transfer(a,b,x): the snapshot taken at the lin-
earization point of op contains all successful transfers con-
cerning a in Lℓ . By the induction hypothesis, the balance
corresponding to this snapshot non-negative. By the algo-
rithm, the balance is less than x .
• op is a successful transfer(a,b,x). Let Ls , s ≤ ℓ, be the pre-
fix of Lℓ that only contains operations linearized before the
moment of time when qo has taken the snapshot just before
accessing kCo .
As before accessing kCo , q went through all preceding k-
consensus objects associated with a and put the decided
values in AS , Ls must include all outgoing transfer opera-
tions for a. Furthermore, Ls includes a subset of all incoming
transfers on a. Thus, balance(a,Lk ) ≤ balance(a,Lℓ).
By the algorithm, as op = transfer(a,b,x) succeeds, we have
balance(a,Lk ) ≥ x . Thus, balance(a,Lℓ) ≥ x and the result-
ing balance in Lℓ+1 is non-negative.
Thus, H is linearizable. 
Theorem 2. A k-shared asset-transfer object has consensus num-
ber k .
Proof. It follows directly from Lemma 1 that k-shared asset-
transfer has consensus number at leastk . Moreover, it follows from
Lemma 2 that k-shared asset-transfer has consensus number at
most k . Thus, the consensus number of k-shared asset-transfer is
exactly k . 
5 ASSET TRANSFER IN MESSAGE PASSING
We established our theoretical results in a shared memory system
with crash failures, proving that consensus is not necessary for
implementing an asset transfer system. Moreover, a natural gener-
alization of such a system where up to k processes have access to
atomic operations on the same account has consensus number k .
These results help us understand the level of difficulty of certain
problems in the domain of cryptocurrencies. To achieve a practical
impact, however, we need an algorithm deployable as a distributed
system in a realistic setting. Arguably, such a setting is one where
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processes (some of which are potentially malicious) communicate
by exchanging messages.
In this section we overview an extension of our results to the
message passing systemwith Byzantine failures. Instead of consen-
sus, we rely on a secure broadcast primitive that provides reliable
delivery with weak (weaker than FIFO) ordering guarantees [36].
Using secure broadcast, processes announce their transfers to the
rest of the system. We establish dependencies among these trans-
fers that induce a partial order. Using a method similar to (a weak
form of) vector clocks [29], we make sure that each process applies
the transfers respecting this dependency-induced partial order. In
a nutshell, a transfer only depends on all previous transfers outgo-
ing from the same account, and on a subset of transfers incoming
to that account. Each transfer operation corresponds to one invo-
cation of secure broadcast by the corresponding account’s owner.
The message being broadcast carries, in addition to the transfer
itself, references to the transfer’s dependencies.
As secure broadcast only provides liveness if the sender is cor-
rect, faulty processes might not be able to perform any transfers.
However, due to secure broadcast’s delivery properties, the correct
processes will always have a consistent view of the system state.
Every transfer operation only entails a single invocation of se-
cure broadcast and our algorithm does not send any additional
messages. Our algorithm inherits the complexity from the un-
derlying secure broadcast implementation, and there is plenty of
such algorithms optimizing complexity metrics for various set-
tings [10, 11, 21, 25, 35, 36, 45]. In practice, as shown by a prelimi-
nary deployment based on a naive quadratic secure broadcast im-
plementation [10] in a medium-sized system (up to 100 processes),
our solution outperforms a consensus-based one by 1.5x to 6x in
throughput and by up to 2x in latency.
The implementation can be further extended to solve the k-
shared asset transfer problem. As we showed in Section 4, agree-
ment among a subset of the processes is necessary in such a case.
We associate each account (owned by up to k processes) with a
Byzantine-fault tolerant state machine replication (BFT) service ex-
ecuted by the owners [13] of that account. The BFT service assigns
sequence numbers to transfers which the processes then submit to
an extended version of the above-mentioned transfer protocol. As
long as the replicated state machine is safe and live, we guaran-
tee that every invoked transfer operation eventually returns. If an
account becomes compromised (i.e., the safety or liveness of the
BFT is violated), only the corresponding account might lose live-
ness. In other words, outgoing transfers from the compromised ac-
count may not return, while safety and liveness of transfers from
“healthy” accounts are always guaranteed. We describe this exten-
sion in more details later (Section 6).
In the rest of this section, we give details on the Byzantine mes-
sage passing model, adapt our asset-transfer object accordingly
(Sec. 5.1) and present its broadcast-based implementation (Sec. 5.2).
5.1 Byzantine Message Passing Model
A process is Byzantine if it deviates from the algorithm it is as-
signed, either by halting prematurely, in which case we say that the
process is crashed, or performing actions that are not prescribed by
its algorithm, in which case we say that the process is malicious.
Malicious processes can perform arbitrary actions, except for ones
that involve subverting cryptographic primitives (e.g. inverting se-
cure hash functions). A process is called faulty if it is either crashed
or malicious. A process is correct if it is not faulty and benign if it
is not malicious. Note that every correct process is benign, but not
necessarily vice versa.
We only require that the transfer system behaves correctly to-
wards benign processes, regardless of the behavior of Byzantine
ones. Informally, we want to require that no benign process can be
a victim of a double-spending attack, i.e., every execution appears
to benign processes as a correct sequential execution, respecting
the original execution’s real-time ordering [27].
For the sake of efficiency, in our algorithm, we slightly relax
the last requirement—while still preventing double-spending. We
require that successful transfer operations invoked by benign pro-
cesses constitute a legal sequential history that preserves the real-
time order. A read or a failed transfer operation invoked by a be-
nign process p can be “outdated”—it can be based on a stale state
of p’s balance. Informally, one can view the system requirements
as linearizability [28] for successful transfers and sequential consis-
tency [6] for failed transfers and reads. One can argue that this re-
laxation incurs little impact on the system’s utility, since all incom-
ing transfers are eventually applied. As progress (liveness) guaran-
tees, we require that every operation invoked by a correct process
eventually completes.
Definition 1. Let E be any execution of an implementation and
H be the corresponding history. Let ops(H ) denote the set of oper-
ations in H that were executed by correct processes in E. An asset-
transfer object in message passing guarantees that each invocation
issued by a correct process is followed by a matching response in H ,
and that there exists H¯ , a completion of H , such that:
(1) Let H¯ t denote the sub-history of successful transfers of H¯
performed by correct processes and ≺t
H¯
be the subset of ≺H¯
restricted to operations in H¯ t . Then there exists a legal se-
quential history S such that (a) for every correct process p,
H¯ t |p = S |p and (b) ≺t
H¯
⊆≺S .
(2) For every correct process p, there exists a legal sequential his-
tory Sp such that:
• ops(H¯ ) ⊆ ops(Sp ), and
• Sp |p = H¯ |p.
Notice that property (2) implies that every update in H that af-
fects the account of a correct process p is eventually included in
p’s “local” history and, therefore, will reflect reads and transfer op-
erations subsequently performed by p.
5.2 Asset Transfer Implementation in Message
Passing
Instead of consensus, we rely on a secure broadcast primitive that
is strictly weaker than consensus and has a fully asynchronous im-
plementation. It provides uniform reliable delivery despite Byzan-
tine faults and so-called source order among delivered messages.
The source order property, being even weaker than FIFO, guaran-
tees that messages from the same source are delivered in the same
order by all correct processes. More precisely, the secure broadcast
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primitive we use in our implementation has the following proper-
ties [36]:
• Integrity: A benign process delivers a message m from a
processp at most once and, ifp is benign, only ifp previously
broadcastm.
• Agreement: If processes p and q are correct and p delivers
m, then q deliversm.
• Validity: If a correct processp broadcastsm, thenp delivers
m.
• Source order: Ifp and q are benign and both deliverm from
r andm′ from r , then they do so in the same order.
Operation. To perform a transfer tx , a process p securely broad-
casts a message with the transfer details: the arguments of the
transfer operation (see Section 2.2) and some metadata. The meta-
data includes a per-process sequence number of tx and references
to the dependencies of tx . The dependencies are transfers incoming
to p that must be known to any process before applying tx . These
dependencies impose a causal relation between transfers that must
be respected when transfers are being applied. For example, sup-
pose that process p makes a transfer tx to process q and q, after
observing tx , performs another transfer tx ′ to process r . q’s broad-
cast message will contain tx ′, a local sequence number, and a refer-
ence to tx . Any process (not only r ) will only evaluate the validity
of tx ′ after having applied tx . This approach is similar to using
vector clocks for implementing causal order among events [29].
To ensure the authenticity of operations—so that no process is
able to debit another process’s account—we assume that processes
sign all their messages before broadcasting them. In practice, simi-
lar to Bitcoin and other transfer systems, every process possesses a
public-private key pair that allows only p to securely initiate trans-
fers from its corresponding account. For simplicity of presentation,
we omit this mechanism in the algorithm pseudocode.
Figure 4 describes the full algorithm implementing asset-
transfer in a Byzantine-prone message passing system. Each pro-
cessp maintains, for each processq, an integer seq[q] reflecting the
number of transfers which process q initiated and which process
p has validated and applied. Process p also maintains, for every
process q, an integer rec[q] reflecting the number of transfers pro-
cess q has initiated and processp has delivered (but not necessarily
applied).
Additionally, there is also a list hist[q] of transfers which involve
process q. We say that a transfer operation involves a process q if
that transfer is either outgoing or incoming on the account of q.
Each process p maintains as well a local variable deps. This is a set
of transfers incoming for p that p has applied since the last success-
ful outgoing transfer. Finally, the set toValidate contains delivered
transfers that are pending validation (i.e., have been delivered, but
not yet validated).
To perform a transfer operation, process p first checks the bal-
ance of its own account, and if the balance is insufficient, returns
false (line 3). Otherwise, process p broadcasts a message with this
operation via the secure broadcast primitive (line 4). This message
includes the three basic arguments of a transfer operation as well
as seq[p]+1 and dependencies deps. Each correct process in the sys-
tem eventually delivers this message via secure broadcast (line 8).
Note that, given the assumption of no process executing more than
Local variables:
seq[ ], initially seq[q] = 0, ∀q {Number of validated transfers outgoing from q}
rec[ ], initially rec[q] = 0, ∀q {Number of delivered transfers from q}
hist [ ], initially hist [q] = ∅, ∀q {Set of validated transfers involving q}
deps, initially ∅ {Set of last incoming transfers for account of local process p}
toValidate, initially ∅ {Set of delivered (but not validated) transfers}
1 operation transfer(a, b, x ) where µ(a) = {p }
2 if balance(a, hist [p] ∪ deps) < x then
3 return false
4 broadcast([(a, b, x, seq[p] + 1), deps])
5 deps = ∅
6 operation read(a)
7 return balance(a, hist [a] ∪ deps)
8 upon deliver(q,m)
9 letm be [(q, d, y, s), h]
10 if s = rec[q] + 1 then
11 rec[q] = rec[q] + 1
12 toValidate = toValidate ∪ {(q,m)}
13 upon (q, [t, h]) ∈ toValidate ∧ Valid(q, t, h)
14 let t be (q, d, y, s)
15 hist [q] := hist [q] ∪ h ∪ {t }
16 seq[q] = s
17 if d = p then
18 deps = deps ∪ (q, d, y, s)
19 if q = p then
20 return true
21 function Valid(q, t, h)
22 let t be (c, d, y, s)
23 return (q = c )
24 and (s = seq[q] + 1)
25 and (balance(c, hist [q]) ≥ y)
26 and (∀(a, b, x, r ) ∈ h : (a, b, x, r ) ∈ hist [a])
27 function balance(a, h)
28 return sum of incoming minus outgoing transfers for account a in h
Figure 4: Consensusless transfer system based on secure
broadcast. Code for every process p.
one concurrent transfer, every process waits for delivery of its
own message before initiating another broadcast. This effectively
turns the source order property of secure broadcast into FIFO order.
Upon delivery, process p checks this message for well-formedness
(lines 9 and 10), and then adds it to the set of messages pending
validation. We explain the validation procedure later.
Once a transfer passes validation (the predicate in line 13 is sat-
isfied), processp applies this transfer on the local state. Applying a
transfer means that process p adds this transfer and its dependen-
cies to the history of the outgoing (line 15) account. If the transfer
is incoming for local process p, it is also added to deps, the set of
current dependencies for p (line 18). If the transfer is outgoing for
p, i.e., it is the currently pending transfer operation invoked by p,
then the response true is returned (line 20).
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To perform a read(a) operation for account a, process p simply
computes the balance of this account based on the local history
hist[a] (line 28).
Before applying a transfer op from some processq, processp val-
idates op via the Valid function (lines 21–26). To be valid, op must
satisfy four conditions. The first condition is that process q (the is-
suer of transfer op) must be the owner of the outgoing account for
op (line 23). Second, any preceding transfers that process q issued
must have been validated (line 24). Third, the balance of account q
must not drop below zero (line 25). Finally, the reported dependen-
cies of op (encoded in h of line 26) must have been validated and
exist in hist[q].
Lemma 3. In any infinite execution of the algorithm (Figure 4),
every operation performed by a correct process eventually completes.
Proof. A transfer operation that fails or a read operation in-
voked by a correct process returns immediately (lines 3 and 7, re-
spectively).
Consider a transfer operation T invoked by a correct process
p that succeeds (i.e., passes the check in line 2), so p broadcasts a
message with the transfer details using secure broadcast (line 4).
By the validity property of secure broadcast, p eventually delivers
the message (via the secure broadcast callback, line 8) and adds
it to the toValidate set. By the algorithm, this message includes a
set deps of operations (called h, line 9) that involve p’s account.
This set includes transfers that process p delivered and validated
after issuing the prior successful outgoing transfer (or since sys-
tem initialization if there is no such transfer) but before issuing T
(lines 4 and 5).
As process p is correct, it operates on its own account, respects
the sequence numbers, and issues a transfer only if it has enough
balance on the account. Thus, when it is delivered by p, T must
satisfy the first three conditions of the Valid predicate (lines 23–25).
Moreover, by the algorithm, all dependencies (labeledh in function
Valid) included in T are in the history hist[p] and, thus the fourth
validation condition (line 26) also holds.
Thus, p eventually validates T and completes the operation by
returning true in line 20. 
Theorem 3. The algorithm in Figure 4 implements an asset-
transfer object type.
Proof. Fix an execution E of the algorithm, let H be the corre-
sponding history.
LetV denote the set of all messages that were delivered (line 8)
and validated (line 23) at correct processes in E. Every message
m = [(q,d,y, s),h] ∈ V is put in hist[q] (line 15). We define an
order ⊆ V × V as follows. For m = [(q,d,y, s),h] ∈ V and
m′ = [(r ,d ′,y′, s ′),h′] ∈ V , we havem  m′ if and only if one of
the following conditions holds:
• q = r and s < s ′,
• (r ,d ′,y′, s ′) ∈ h, or
• there existsm′′ ∈ V such thatm m′′ andm′′  m′.
By the source order property of secure broadcast (see Sec-
tion 5.2), correct processes p and r deliver messages from any pro-
cess q in the same order. By the algorithm in Figure 4, a message
from q with a sequence number i is added by a correct process
to toValidate set only if the previous message from q added to
toValidate had sequence number i−1 (line 10). Furthermore, a mes-
sagem = [(q,d,y, s),h] is validated at a correct process only if all
messages in h have been previously validated (line 26). Therefore,
 is acyclic and thus can be extended to a total order.
Let S be the sequential history constructed from any such total
order onmessages inV in which every messagem = [(q,d,y, s),h]
is replaced with the invocation-response pair transfer(q,d,y); true.
By construction, every operation transfer(q,d,y) in S is pre-
ceded by a sequence of transfers that ensure that the balance of
q does not drop below y (line 25). In particular, S includes all out-
going transfers from the account of q performed previously by q
itself. Additionally S may order some incoming transfer to q that
did not appear at hist[q] before the corresponding (q,d,y, s) has
been added to it. But these “unaccounted” operations may only in-
crease the balance of q and, thus, it is indeed legal to return true.
By construction, for each correct process p, S respects the order
of successful transfers issued by p. Thus, the subsequence of suc-
cessful transfers in H “looks” linearizable to the correct processes:
H , restricted to successful transfers witnessed by the correct pro-
cesses, is consistent with a legal sequential history S .
Let p be a correct process in E. Now letVp denote the set of all
messages that were delivered (line 8) and validated (line 23) at p
in E. Let p be the subset of  restricted to the elements in Vp .
Obviously, p is cycle-free and we can again extend it to a total
order. Let Sp be the sequential history build in the same way as S
above. Similarly, we can see that Sp is legal and, by construction,
consistent with the local history of all operations of p (including
reads and failed transfers).
By Lemma 3, every operation invoked by a correct process even-
tually completes. Thus, E indeed satisfies the properties of an asset-
transfer object type. 
6 k-SHARED ASSET TRANSFER IN MESSAGE
PASSING
Our message-passing asset-transfer implementation can be nat-
urally extended to the k-shared case, when some accounts are
owned by up to k processes. As we showed in Section 4, a purely
asynchronous implementation of a k-shared asset-transfer does
not exist, even in the benign shared-memory environment.
k-shared BFT service. To circumvent this impossibility, we as-
sume that every account is associated with a Byzantine fault-
tolerant state-machine replication service (BFT [13]) that is used
by the account’s owners to order their outgoing transfers. More
precisely, the transfers issued by the owners are assigned mono-
tonically increasing sequence numbers.
The service can be implemented by the owners themselves,
acting both as clients, submitting requests, and replicas, reaching
agreement on the order in which the requests must be served. As
long as more than two thirds of the owners are correct, the service
is safe, in particular, no sequence number is assigned to more than
one transfer. Moreover, under the condition that the owners can
eventually communicate within a bounded message delay, every
request submitted by a correct owner is guaranteed to be even-
tually assigned a sequence number [13]. One can argue that it is
muchmore likely that this assumption of eventual synchrony holds
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for a bounded set of owners, rather than for the whole set of sys-
tem participants. Furthermore, communication complexity of such
an implementation is polynomial in k and not in N , the number of
processes.
Account order in secure broadcast. Consider even the case where
the threshold of one third of Byzantine owners is exceeded, where
the account may become blocked or, even worse, compromised. In
this case, different owners may be able to issue two different trans-
fers associated with the same sequence number.
This issue can be mitigated by a slight modification of the clas-
sical secure broadcast algorithm [36]. In addition to the properties
of Integrity, Validity and Agreement of secure broadcast, the mod-
ified algorithm can implement the property of account order, gen-
eralizing the source order property (Section 5.2). Assume that each
broadcast message is equippedwith a sequence number (generated
by the BFT service, as we will see below).
• Account order: If a benign process p delivers messagesm
(with sequence number s) and m′ (with sequence number
s ′) such thatm andm′ are associated with the same account
and s < s ′, then p deliversm beforem′.
Informally, the implementation works as follows. The sender
sends the message (containing the account reference and the se-
quence number) it wants to broadcast to all and waits until it re-
ceives acknowledgements from a quorum of more than two thirds
of the processes. A message with a sequence number s associated
with an account a is only acknowledged by a benign process if
the last message associated with a it delivered had sequence num-
ber s − 1. Once a quorum is collected, the sender sends the mes-
sage equipped with the signed quorum to all and delivers the mes-
sage. This way, the benign processes deliver the messages associ-
ated with the same account in the same order. If the owners of
an account send conflicting messages for the same sequence num-
ber, the account may block. However, and most importantly, even
a compromised account is always prevented from double spend-
ing. Liveness of operations on a compromised account is not guar-
anteed, but safety and liveness of other operations remains unaf-
fected.
Putting it all together. The resulting k-shared asset transfer sys-
tem is a composition of a collection of BFT services (one per
account), the modified secure broadcast protocol (providing the
account-order property), and a slightly modified protocol in Fig-
ure 4.
To issue a transfer operation t on an account a it owns, a process
p first submits t to the associated BFT service to get a sequence
number. Assuming that the account is not compromised and the
service is consistent, the transfer receives a unique sequence num-
ber s . Note that the decided tuple (a, t , s) should be signed by a
quorum of owners: this will be used by the other processes in the
system to ensure that the sequence number has been indeed agreed
upon by the owners of a. The process executes the protocol in Fig-
ure 4, with the only modification that the sequence number seq is
now not computed locally but adopted from the BFT service.
Intuitively, as the transfers associated with a given account are
processed by the benign processes in the same order, the resulting
protocol ensures that the history of successful transfers is lineariz-
able. On the liveness side, the protocol ensures that every transfer
on a non-compromised account is guaranteed to complete.
7 RELATED WORK
Many systems address the problem of asset transfers, be they for a
permissioned (private, with a trusted external access control mech-
anism) [4, 26, 31] or permissionless (public, prone to Sybil attacks)
setting [2, 16, 22, 33, 38, 44]. Decentralized systems for the pub-
lic setting are open to the world. To prevent malicious parties
from overtaking the system, these systems rely on Sybil-proof tech-
niques, e.g., proof-of-work [38], or proof-of-stake [7]. The above-
mentioned solutions, whether for the permissionless or the permis-
sioned environment, seek to solve consensus. Theymust inevitably
rely on synchrony assumptions or randomization. By sidestepping
consensus, we can provide a deterministic and asynchronous im-
plementation.
It is worth noting that many of those solutions allow for more
than just transfers, and support richer operations on the system
state—so-called smart contracts. Our paper focuses on the original
asset transfer problem, as defined byNakamoto [38], andwe do not
address smart contracts, for certain forms of which consensus is in-
deed necessary. However, our approach allows for arbitrary opera-
tions, if those operations affect groups of the participants that can
solve consensus among themselves. Potential safety or liveness vi-
olations of those operations (in case this group gets compromised)
are confined to the group and do not affect the rest of the system.
In the blockchain ecosystem, a lot of work has been devoted to
avoid a totally ordered chain of transfers. The idea is to replace
the totally ordered linear structure of a blockchain with that of a
directed acyclic graph (DAG) for structuring the transfers in the
system. Notable systems in this spirit include Byteball [14], Veg-
visir [31], Corda [26], Nano [34], or the GHOST protocol [41]. Even
if these systems use a DAG to replace the classic blockchain, they
still employ consensus.
We can also use a DAG to characterize the relation between
transfers, but we do not resort to solving consensus to build the
DAG, nor do we use the DAG to solve consensus. More precisely,
we can regard each account as having an individual history. Each
such history ismanaged by the corresponding account ownerwith-
out depending on a global view of the system. Histories are loosely
coupled through a causality relation established by dependencies
among transfers.
The important insight that an asynchronous broadcast-style ab-
straction suffices for transfers appears in the literature as early
as 2002, due to Pedone and Schiper [39]. Duan et. al. [17] intro-
duce efficient Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols for storage and
also build on this insight. So does recent work by Gupta [24] on
financial transfers which seems closest to ours; the proposed algo-
rithm is based on similar principles as some implementations of
secure broadcast [35, 36]. To the best of our knowledge, however,
we are the first to formally define the asset transfer problem as a
shared object type, study its consensus number, and propose algo-
rithms building on top of standard abstractions that are amenable
to a real deployment in cryptocurrencies.
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